Propaganda und Geschichte – „Dieser Blutgeneral ist Putins Vorbild“

Der Diktator Putin eifert, wie wir zu wissen glauben, vielen Vorbildern nach. Die meisten sind gnadenlose Herrschergestalten. Da sind die großen Zaren des alten Imperiums von Wladimir I. über Iwan den Schrecklichen bis Nikolaus I., da ist aber auch – quasi naturwüchsig – Stalin. Unter den Idolen „zweiter Ordnung“ befindet sich neben dem „weißen“ General und brutalen Antisemiten Denikin ein anderes Monstrum, der chilenische Diktator Pinochet. „BILD“ war sich am 4. Februar dieses Jahres ganz sicher: „Dieser Blutgeneral ist Putins Vorbild.“ Und Peter Tiede, Chefreporter des wahrheitsliebenden Blatts, glaubt dies belegen zu können. Tatsächlich hat der damalige Zweite Bürgermeister von Petersburg im Jahre 1993 vor deutschen Unternehmen „unter bestimmten Umständen“ eine russische Dikatur nach dem Vorbild Pinochets gebilligt.

Das ND jedenfalls berichtete am 31.12. 1993;

Er, Putin, billige angesichts des schwierigen privatwirtschaftlichen Weges eventuelle Vorbereitungen Jelzins und des Militärs zur Herbeiführung einer Diktatur nach Pinochet-Vorbild ausdrücklich. Putins Ausführungen wurden sowohl von den deutschen Firmenvertretern als auch von dem anwesenden stellvertretenden deutschen Generalkonsul mit freundlichem Beifall aufgenommen.

According to science, Putin’s statements were a tad more brutal.

Er (Putin) hatte eine Vision für Russland: Eine Militärdiktatur wie in Chile unter Diktator Augusto Pinochet (†91). Die war zwar ungemein brutal, blutig – aber nach Putins Lesart wirtschaftlich erfolgreich.

Was hat er denn nun wirklich gesagt? Vertrauen wir dem ZDF. Für die Doku „Putins Wahrheit“ (2022) hat der Sender tatsächlich eine kurze Filmsequenz gefunden: Zunächst gibt es Bilder von Sankt Petersburg im Regen, einer alten Bettlerin, herumhängenden jungen Arbeitslosen und den Kommentar: „Dies könnte das neue El Dorado werden“. Dann sehen wir einige deutsche Unternehmer im „Business Attire“ der frühen 90er. Sie warten in einem kargen Raum auf den „Kommunalpolitiker“. Einer sagt schließlich:“Es kommt der Ehrengast“ und erhebt sich. Händeschütteln, Blumenstrauß. Putin hat Geburtstag. Das gibt uns wenigstens den Terminus post quem: das Treffen fand wahrscheinlich am 7. Oktober 1993 statt. Zu Beginn schlägt Putin vor, Fragen zu stellen („damit unser Gespräch zielstrebig wird“). Dann endet der Film. Was folgt, erfahren wir – als Fragmente – vom Hörensagen. Ein deutscher Generalmanager (wir sehen einen seriösen älteren Herrn), habe die Frage gestellt, „ob eine Diktatur nach chilenischem Pinochetmuster nicht nur in Kreisen des russischen Militärs erwogen werde“. Putin, „ermuntert(?) durch die Frage“, habe geantwortet:

Wenn Sie so fragen. Ich befürworte eine Pinochet-Diktatur in Russland.

Das Gespräch ist sicher interessant, aber die Quelle ist leider nicht ganz so eindeutig, wie BILD suggeriert, obwohl der Redakteur den Augen- und Ohrenzeugen vorgibt. Und zwar einen mit geschärften Sinnen:

The group in St. Petersburg had to swallow, but the German gentlemen (the recordings show that at least one lady was present, ww.) clapped in the end – after all, it was about business…Vor ihnen saß 1993 ein schmales Hemdchen von unscheinbarem Mann, der ihnen seine Welt erklärte: der Kommunist Wladimir Putin, damals 41 und Vize-Bürgermeister der Stadt Sankt Petersburg, heute 70 und bluttriefender Kreml-Führer.

Other media also consider the statements to be relevant but present them in different variations, as stated in the SPIEGEL on March 6, 2022 („How Putin thinks, could have been known as early as 1993… A dictatorship modeled after Pinochet would be a desirable solution given the political problems“). Let’s be cautious: the phrases provided are too short and not clear enough for an appropriate interpretation. What was Putin’s exact response? How did the entire conversation unfold? Was „the unremarkable man in the narrow shirt“ really (still) a communist back then? Who asked him the Pinochet question? In what interest? Why specifically Pinochet? What was the exact wording of the question? And most importantly, in what specific and broader context were these words spoken? How should we, who are now 30 years wiser but not necessarily smarter, interpret them? Let’s first go back to the „Early Nineties“. The wild time of the East.

„Schocktherapie“

A change of perspective is always helpful. What is certain is that in the early 90s, the „Pinochet Syndrome“ was omnipresent among political and economic decision-makers in the West. The images of the Chilean coup in 1973 were readily available in their minds. The sinister role of the US government was known, but hardly addressed, as the focus was still on the relentless establishment of unregulated capitalism, this time in the crumbling Soviet Union. According to Clinton’s Secretary of State Christopher, it was the „greatest strategic challenge of our time“. The executors of the „Enlargement“ felt justified by an alleged neoliberal „success story“: Chile, Argentina, Uruguay. Although they had a bloody history on their conscience, freedom was also understood as a necessity by committed neoliberals. „Only a crisis leads to real change,“ decreed neoliberal thinker Friedman. An American police officer had turned it into a concise maxim for the executing organs: „The right pain in the right place to the right degree.“ The result: mass murders in South America, the subjugation of the labor movement in Thatcher’s kingdom (with a small victorious war over the Maldives). Perhaps the CIA, Pinochet, and his henchmen had exceeded the „right degree“. The global public was „not amused“ by the extent of brutality. However, the connection between political terror and the dogma of absolute economic freedom was elegantly ignored.

Now the agonizing Soviet Union was to be „shock-therapied“. The therapists were mostly located in Washington (World Bank, IMF), Chicago (neoliberal Friedman disciples), and Harvard (Institute for International Development, Jeffrey Sachs). The medicine was prescribed by the G7 leaders (Bush senior, Major, Kaifu, etc.). The corresponding media ensured the acceptance of the therapy and the reassuring wording through „mainstreaming“ among the influencers. And they had hardly any problems putting the „Pinochet project“ into the Overton window. It was only about the method after the coup. Naomi Klein quotes in „The Shock Doctrine“ (2007) some representative statements: The Economist already asked in a subheading in 1990: „Michail Sergeyevich Pinochet?“, and the Washington Post titled shortly after the G7 summit in 1991: „Pinochet’s Chile – an example for the Soviet economy.“ In the same text, the fluffy phrase of the „Pinochet option“ also appeared. The author, of course not a „blood journalist“, regretted that the liberal opponents of Gorbachev lacked „insight and support“.

Thomas Piketty has demonstrated that there were indeed other egalitarian alternatives at the time. For example, Gorbachev, the President of the soon-to-be dissolved Soviet Union, preferred the social democratic version of capitalism (progressive taxation, welfare state, participation). However, the path was set: a certain Boris Yeltsin, elected President of the Russian republic in June 1991, seemed to be the most suitable candidate for the harsh Pinochet-style project leaders, even though he did not possess the same aura as Gorbachev. Historian Tony Judt characterizes him as „an ordinary bureaucrat of the Brezhnev era, specializing in industrial construction.“ But Yeltsin knew his usefulness and took advantage of „his“ moments. In 1990, he ostentatiously resigned from the Communist Party as a deputy of the Russian Federation, in order to passionately advocate for the independence of the Baltic states. In August 1991, during the communist old guard’s coup attempt, Yeltsin, who had been President of the Russian republic for two months, portrayed himself as a fervent democrat and defender of the „White House,“ the parliament. He had previously secured support from the head of the KGB. He also knew that Bush, as well as Major and Mitterand, would support him financially and politically. From a tank, reading from a script, he called out to the soldiers: „Do not become blind weapons of the criminal will of adventurers!“ Yeltsin seemed to embody the „wind of change.“ And it blew strongly: since the army remained on the sidelines (unlike in Chile), the coup failed miserably. The „border states“ declared their independence from the Soviet Union. And the once powerful Soviet Union became an „empty shell“ (Judt).

Im Dezember desselben Jahres erklärte Jelzin zusammen mit den Ministerpräsidenten der Sowjetrepubliken Ukraine und Weißrussland offiziell das Ende der Sowjetunion. Ab diesem Zeitpunkt existierte nur noch die „Gemeinschaft unabhängiger Staaten“. Gorbatschow blieb nur der Rücktritt übrig. Nun konnte die Schocktherapie beginnen. Die „Nesawissimaja Gaseta“ sagte damals voraus, dass es keine Überraschung sein würde, wenn sie versuchen würden, ein hausgemachtes Pinochet-System aufzubauen…

„I cannot reword“

Die Demokratie kann nur in Form einer begrenzten Demokratie konserviert werden kann. Eine unbegrenzte Demokratie zerstört sich notwendig selbst.

„The logic of creative destruction“ (Naomi Klein) of the Soviet Union led (as planned) to a spiral of dismantling. The liberalization of prices was followed in early 1993 by the „core of the reform,“ the „voucher privatization.“ In principle, any citizen could become a shareholder through a share certificate. However, in the context of hyperinflation and mass impoverishment, the vouchers were accumulated by small, well-informed circles. The policy of „enrich yourselves“ resulted in the „oligarchs“ being able to appropriate 30-40% of the Russian national income, a fortune perfect for multiplying in the tax havens of our beautiful world.

However, there was indeed resistance. Democratic and parliamentary. In December 1992, Prime Minister Gaidar was actually voted out of office. In March 1993, the parliamentarians who were elected during the Soviet Union era rightfully revoked Yeltsin’s special powers. The freedom hero and friend of the US President responded by declaring a state of emergency. Clinton personally met with Yeltsin in early April 1993 and promised financial support. Yeltsin showed „true dedication to freedom and democracy, true dedication to reforms.“ The ensuing „constitutional conflict,“ which was actually a fierce power struggle, ended up resembling Pinochet’s regime. Initially, Yeltsin had the „White House“ blocked. Unlike in 1991, this time he faced a hostile crowd. An eyewitness reported that he was „running around like a chicken without a head.“ On October 4, at 5 am, he received support from the army commander and ordered the storming of the „White House.“ Naomi Klein comments:

5000 Soldaten in Marsch, Dutzende von Panzern, Hubschrauber und Elitetruppen – all das, um Russlands neue kapitalistische Wirtschaft vor der ernsthaften Bedrohung durch die Demokratie zu schützen.

„I cannot reword“

Entschuldigung für die Störung.
Ich habe versucht, dich bestmöglich zu unterstützen, indem ich die Ereignisse aufmerksam verfolgt habe und meine Unterstützung zum Ausdruck gebracht habe.

Und die westlichen Medien verbreiteten gute Stimmung. Die Parole lautete: „Ein Sieg für die Demokratie“. US-Außenminister Christopher flog nach Moskau und zeigte sich als abgeklärter Demokrat:

Die Vereinigten Staaten unterstützen nicht leichten Herzens die Suspendierung von Parlamenten. Aber dies sind außergewöhnliche Zeiten.

How often time turned in these times!A presidential dictatorship corresponded to the „Western“ interests, both economically and politically. Warren Christopher offered Yeltsin a „Partnership for Peace“, open to all NATO countries as well as those from the old Warsaw Pact. However, he left the possibility of future NATO memberships open for the „border states“. Let’s briefly continue the thread because it shows its relevance to the present: in 1995 – during Clinton’s visit to Moscow for the 50th anniversary of victory – there was a memorable conversation about the NATO memberships of the „border states“. It was also memorable because it demonstrated Yeltsin’s dependence on the USA. According to American protocol, the Russian president fought against NATO expansion like a lion.

I understand your argumentation, Jelzin. But Bill, it’s not just about a strategic question here, but about an overlap of political problems this year, the parliamentary elections, and next year, the presidential elections. Making a wrong move now could ruin everything. So please postpone.
dieses Thema, wenn nicht bis zum Jahr 2000, dann zumindest für die nächsten Jahre, bis wir beide die Wahlen hinter uns gebracht haben. (…).

The lion naturally bit into granite. The American president was also in campaign mode.

aber das ändert nichts an unserer Entscheidung. Wir haben unsere Gründe dafür und werden sie nicht ändern.I have told you that we will not do that.

The US government’s „Russia first“ policy gradually lost its significance. The focus of US support shifted to the „border states,“ particularly Ukraine, with which NATO signed the „NATO-Ukraine Charter“ in 1997.

Kehren wir für eine Zwischenbilanz zum eigentlichen Thema ins Jahr 1993 zurück. Das Petersburger Gespräch fand am Donnerstag, dem 7. Oktober statt, also 3 Tage nach dem Putsch Jelzins. Die Frage des deutschen Managers an Putin und dessen Billigung von „eventuelle(n) Vorbereitungen Jelzins und des Militärs zur Herbeiführung einer Diktatur nach Pinochet-Vorbild“ (vergl. ND) bezieht sich also mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit auf die dramatischen Ereignisse des Jelzin-Putsches und dessen Folgen. Allen Anwesenden waren die Konnotationen geläufig: Jelzin und sein Team praktizierten die Methoden von 1973, nur nicht ganz so brutal. Methoden, mit denen man damals in Russland Society machen wollte und konnte. Das würde die Frage des Managers und die Antwort Putins erklären. Diese ist ja gewissermaßen das Echo der Frage. Was auch immer der zweite Bürgermeister wörtlich gesagt hat, ein positiver Pinochetbezug konnte im Oktober 1993 in Russlands politischer Klasse nicht außergewöhnlich sein. Syntagmen wie „das Pinochet-Projekt“ waren mittlerweile banalisiert. Ähnlich dachte offensichtlich auch die amerikanische Regierung, obwohl sie als Nachfolger-Verantwortliche von Pinochets blutigen Wirkens öffentlich zu schamhafter Formulierung gezwungen war. Jelzin als russischer Pinochet machte seine Sache in jeder Beziehung gut. Aus der Zustimmung zu einer Frage nach einer Pinochet-Diktatur in Russland („wenn Sie so wollen…“) die Parallelität Pinochet-Putin abzuleiten, wäre jedoch absurd. Die vom deutschen Generalmanager gestellte Frage bezieht das Pinochetmodell nicht ohne Grund ausdrücklich auf Jelzin. Putin selbst war 1993 ein nicht sehr bedeutender Jelzin-Mann und folgte dessen autoritärer Schocktherapie. Nicht mehr, nicht weniger.

Let’s not forget about the consequences of the Yeltsin coup, even if it’s just about gaining a slightly better understanding of the current conflicts.

„I have never had so much fun in my life before.“

After the coup, the capable Russian and American Chicago Boys had a clear path. According to the Doxa, it was necessary to execute all measures simultaneously: massive budget cuts, lifting of all price controls (including basic food), rapid privatizations, the entire neoliberal toolkit. Economists speak with elegant restraint of Russia’s „holistic phase“ (in contrast to, for example, the People’s Republic of China).

„I have never had so much fun in my life,“ confessed Charles Blitzer, Chief Economist for Russia at the World Bank, to the Wall Street Journal in October 1993. A costly pleasure for the population. The promised prosperity for all (created by the super wealth of a few) did not materialize. The sole beneficiaries were – as could be expected – the oligarchs and some Western investment managers. By 2003, egalitarian Russia had already produced 17 billionaires. However, there was one difference between Pinochet-Yeltsin and their counterparts in other shock therapy countries: the spoils were primarily divided among domestic robbers. Their shares miraculously multiplied „offshore“ after the plunder, even though the „profit tax“ in Russia was ridiculously low at a flat rate of 13 percent. The loose „laissez-faire“ of Dick Cheney, Lawrence Summers (Deputy Secretary of the Treasury), and Stanley Fischer (IMF) followed „the pure ideology of the Chicago School,“ according to Naomi Klein. „They let the market do its worst.“

Aber bleiben wir auf dem Weg zu Putin noch kurz bei Jelzin. Dessen Popularität nahm verständlicherweise ständig ab. Folgerichtig inszenierte er einen kleinen, siegreichen Krieg gegen die abtrünnige Republik Tschetschenien. Die Wahl von 1996 gewann Jelzin mit viel Mühe. Im 2. Wahlgang erreichte er gegen den Kommunisten Sjuganow magere 54 Prozent. Freund Clinton hatte mit einem fetten Staatskredit, von 10,2 Mrd. Dollar geholfen. Die NZZ beschrieb 2016 die Unterstützer-Szene Jelzins folgendermaßen:

Es bildete sich damals im Namen der Rettung der Demokratie eine seltsame Allianz aus Amtsinhabern und Bürokraten, dem Big Business, den Medien und der Zivilgesellschaft. Sie stellten sich hinter Boris Jelzin, sicherten seine Wiederwahl und trugen damit die junge russische Demokratie eigenhändig zu Grabe… Since Yeltsin had nothing to offer, his campaign strategists relied on the „continuity of democratic reforms“ and „avoiding the greater evil.“ Government-critical voices suddenly disappeared from television and newspapers, while constant threats of returning to the USSR, civil war, mass terror, and economic collapse were made in the event of Sjuganov’s victory. Sjuganov himself was routinely compared to Hitler..

The second phase of the public property clearance sale could thus be completed (oil, gas, nickel, weapons factories). It continued to be insane: the Russian people financed the exploitation of their own country by their own hyper-capitalists: ministers transferred public funds to private banks owned by oligarchs and entrusted the same banks with auctions for the privatization of public resources. The banks themselves made bids. Naturally.

The outcome was huge, with a super inflation and a high unemployment rate. In a study conducted in 2000, 8% of the Russian population identified themselves as extremely poor, while 65% considered themselves poor. 77% perceived their own economic situation as worse than in 1988 (51.2% as „much worse“).

The Asian financial crisis of 1998 also shook the Russian „Project Pinochet“. Horrific terrorist attacks in 1999 dealt a final blow to the great country. Yeltsin was in a precarious position. A new, strong man like… Vladimir Putin was needed, a relatively unknown man. The newly appointed Prime Minister was given the mission to destroy the Chechen „beasts“. In this second Chechen war, he proved himself as the „protector“ of the „Motherland“ – and as the ideal successor to the no longer sustainable Yeltsin. The transfer of power took place discreetly on December 31, 1999. Putin’s first decree ensured immunity for his predecessor. However, Pinochet was forgotten.

Napoleon, aber auch de Gaulle und Erhard

Wolfgang Leonard, ein Kenner Russlands, entdeckte 2001 bei Putin Vorbilder wie Napoleon, de Gaulle und Ludwig Erhard (sic). Ein Zeitungsbericht gibt seine Worte wieder:

This man is believed to be following the path of the market economy, according to his opinion. Putin, whose role models include Napoleon, General de Gaulle, and Ludwig Erhard, aims to combine authoritarian structures with a market economy. Indications of a shift towards a market economy include improved export opportunities and increased oil and gas prices. Since Putin came to power, Russia has not taken on any new foreign loans. Other important signs of stabilization efforts include the repayment of state employees and the integration attempts of former military personnel into civilian sectors (especially as security personnel) due to the significant reduction in the Russian army. This is a measure taken by Putin to prevent a military coup.

Das klingt wahrlich nicht nach angestrebter (blutiger) Pinochetdiktatur, im Gegenteil: Putin versuchte Leonard zufolge gerade einen Militärputsch zu verhindern. Vor allem aber hatte der Herakles, dieses einst „schmale Hemdchen“, die kapitalhistorische Mission, das sozialdarwinistische Goldgräberchaos zu ordnen, natürlich mit autoritären Mitteln. Die asiatische Finanzkrise von 1998 hatte die Notwendigkeit von Planung gelehrt. Steuernde Maßnahmen zur Wirtschaftsförderung und Innovationspolitik innerhalb der Marktwirtschaft sollten die letztlich letale Schocktherapie der Jelzinzeit beenden, natürlich ohne die Produktionsverhältnisse zu ändern. Und tatsächlich In Putin’s first term, there was a certain stabilization. The Russian economy benefited primarily from the rising oil and gas prices. In 2007, a law on state holdings was enacted, placing them under the sole control of the president. Many liberals and entrepreneurs struggled with these regulations. The „civil society,“ as well as the „free West,“ also criticized media control, the army’s functionalization as a second socialization institution, and the dependence of the judiciary. As known, democracy always limits only others. The careerist Putin of the 90s was – like all „reformers“ – stark gegenüber den Schwachen und schwach gegenüber den Starken. Der Präsident Putin verstieß (in Teilen) gegen die Regeln neoliberaler Gouvernance: er wurde (und ist) stark gegenüber den Schwachen und den Starken.

Einige Oligarchen wurden als kriminell angesehen, während andere quasi zu „Staatsoligarchen“ erhoben wurden. Dies hatte gewisse Ähnlichkeiten mit Bonapartismus. Putin hat jedoch die soziale Ungleichheit nicht angetastet. Trotzdem war und ist der Präsident ziemlich beliebt, auch (oder gerade) während des Krieges, den er offiziell im Namen der Sicherheitsinteressen und der Souveränität Russlands führt. Der historische Soziologe Jean-François Bayart hat dafür eine einfache Erklärung:

Man füttert die Armen mit Armen mit Nationalismus und Identität. Die Reichen erfreuen sich des wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Liberalismus.

Let us be cautious of personalization. It is capitalism. The Chicago Boys experienced their debacle everywhere sooner or later. In general, the phase of „original accumulation“ is followed by the impoverishment of the masses and the immense enrichment of a few. With the decline in accumulation rates and the decrease in acceptance, the state must intervene (against liberalist theory). According to Jean-François Bayart, this creates a „combinatorics“ of three tendencies (often considered antithetical): the economic-liberal integration of the world, the universalization of the state as a nation (principle of sovereignty including resistance or instrumentalization against global homogenization tendencies), and the tendency towards identitarianism. These components also imply the danger of war. Not only do the actions of the Russian president fit into this scheme.

Die Wirksamkeit der Feindbegriffe

But let’s return to Putin’s statements from 1993 after a somewhat lengthy excursion, so to the sources and their closer context. Putin accepts the use of military force against the parliament, which his president has just demonstrated, and the upcoming economic shock strategy. In his role as deputy mayor, he also seems to want to reassure his capitalist audience: Your investment in our city will be secure. As a man of Yeltsin, Putin had to (and wanted to) speak this way. His career would likely have been ended otherwise. For Putin (and his listeners), it seems to be about the shock method of Pinochet, not about the bloody dictator Pinochet himself (although they are connected). The person Pinochet was simply a „fascist“ for not only a Russian „communist“ (as the „BILD“ author Tiede writes), but also an enemy of Russia from a historical perspective. Trying to derive a kinship or even an identity between the „blood general“ Pinochet and the „blood-drenched dictator“ Putin from the very brief text variants of the sources shows at least a certain carelessness. Unless, of course, one is in propaganda mode or a „BILD“ reporter – or both.

Interestingly, the simplistically stated equations do not address the historically more interesting applause from representatives of capital (BASF, Dresdner Bank, Alkatel, etc.). The Antifa-„BILD“ is a peculiar exception. Are the questioner and the supporters also „Pinochet sympathizers“? In that case, Putin’s statements would neither be unique nor sensational, aside from the then not uncommon fact that a former KGB man is speaking. And this confirms: The „Pinochet project“ constructed and carried out in the West, as we have seen, was not necessarily on everyone’s lips in the 90s, in the West as well as in the East, but it was on everyone’s minds, especially when „speaking frankly“ (Putin’s „determination“).

Conclusion. Comparing Putin to Pinochet gives significance to the careerists of the 90s, such as Yeltsin, the Russian Chicagoboys (Gaidar), and others. It deliberately overlooks the former hegemonic US strategy of promoting „original accumulation“ in formerly socialist countries, which is still referred to today as „transition“ or „transformation“ with shame. However, economic violence is usually naturalized. It may be horrifying, but it is beneficial.

Why this current equation of Putin with the „Blood General“? And further asked: Why this demonization of the undoubtedly autocratic president? The answer to both questions is simple: „It’s war, stupid.“ Since 2022, we are once again at risk, with friends and enemies, this „fallen angel from hell.“ The alliterative verbal weapon „Putin is Pinochet“ is simply too tempting. It is more elegant than the silly distortions „Putlin“ or – even more devilish (?) – „Putler,“ preferably decorated with an original mustache image so that every 17-year-old student understands it. The context of 1993 must disappear, including the pre- and post-history, but above all, the deep agreement of large parts of our Western elites with the „Pinochet project.“ Demonizations always de-historicize. They prevent us from coming up with ideas about shock strategy and its consequences, and – above all – about missed opportunities for a „peaceful coexistence“ in Europe before February 24, 2022.

Es bleibt aber noch eine wichtige Frage, die sich mit der scheinbaren Antifa-Haltung der „Bild“ stellt. Ist das Tertium comparationis nicht der Faschismus beider Diktatoren? Ich höre regelrecht das heftige Kopfnicken einiger Leser, die sich an diesenTagen des 50. Jahrestags des chilenischen Putsches, des anderen „NineEleven“, erinnern. Der BILD-Autor scheint sogar Putin für den schlimmeren „Faschisten“ zu halten (und Pinochet damit zu verharmlosen). „Blutgeneral“ klingt zumindest für mich weniger brutal als „bluttriefender Kremlführer“. Meine Antwort wäre mindestens so lang wie dieser Text. Darum möchte ich einen Kompetenteren zitieren, so kurz wie möglich, aber auch so lang wie nötig. In einem Interview mit der TAZ vom 1.7.2022 stellt der Faschismusforscher Ulrich Herbert fest:

The Chilean military dictatorship was a cruel regime that murdered and made thousands of opposition members disappear. We have become accustomed to labeling almost all right-wing dictatorships as „fascist“ and thus associating them with the crimes of the Nazi regime. This was also the case after Pinochet’s coup in 1973, „fascism“ was the central term used to mobilize against the Chilean military regime. However, in Chile there was neither a cult of personality nor a fascist mass movement, no ethnic ideology, not even expansionism. It was a military dictatorship that suppressed and eradicated the left-wing opposition in the country with the help of the USA, also in order to prevent a left-wing development in Latin America. In addition, Chile under Pinochet was the testing ground for extreme neoliberalism. As you can see, the term „fascism“ conceals more than it explains here. It serves primarily to demonstrate our disgust. But that is wearing off.

Und zu Putins Faschismus:

Frage: Gibt es nicht Ähnlichkeiten? In Russland gibt es einen Kult um den Führer, die Diffamierung des Gegners und ein Freund-Feind-Denken, eine totalitäre Formung der Gesellschaft und Aggression nach außen. Diese Merkmale sind typisch für faschistische Regime. Kann man keine Verbindung von Mussolini bis Putin herstellen?

Answer: The characteristics you mentioned can be found in a majority of autocracies and dictatorships worldwide. Fascist regimes differ from authoritarian dictatorships primarily through the mass movement that supports and is supported by the leader, propelling them forward. This dynamic is crucial for fascist regimes. Such dynamics do not exist in Russia. Fascism is a rhetorical term used to associate evil and opposition. Analytically, it is not useful. Following this logic, we could also label China as fascist.

Auch die Gleichsetzung von Putin und Pinochet „verdeckt mehr als sie erklärt“. Sie ist, wie der Faschismusvorwurf in diesem Fall, simple Propaganda. Dass diese „Kampfbegriffe“ sich abnützen, ist eine gute Botschaft. Allein, ihre zu erwartende Obsoleszens wird neue verbale Monstren erzeugen. Leider ist es wirklich so, wie Reinhart Kosellek schreibt:

Tatsächlich pflegt der Andere anders zu sein, als der feindliche Begriff ihm zu sein ansinnt. Ob schlimmer oder besser, ist damit nicht ausgemacht. Gerade in ihrer Verfehlung des Anderen liegt die Wirksamkeit der Feindbegriffe beschlossen.

Wir werden es noch oft erleben.