IIn the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Caucasus, a humanitarian tragedy is currently unfolding. Azerbaijan has forcefully annexed the remaining unoccupied parts of the territory it claims. International observers are already noting signs of a genocide against the Armenian population living in the region.
However, reactions from foreign heads of state, including those from the EU and Germany, were rather restrained: a few condemnations of the violence, a call for a peaceful solution, that was it – just as one would do when not wanting to jeopardize economic interests.
Aus den großen Nachbarländern Russland und Türkei ist in dem Konflikt ohnehin kein Eintreten für die Armenier zu erwarten, auch wenn Russland sich oft als Schutzmacht Armeniens präsentiert hat. Die Regierung in Baku hat überall in den Schaltzentralen der Macht, im Westen wie im Osten, verlässliche Partner. Dass es so gekommen ist, hat vor allem wirtschaftliche Gründe.
Azerbaijan has been playing a significant role in diversifying Europe’s gas supply for a long time. Although gas started flowing to Europe only in 2020, the planning for it dates back to 2006. At that time, doubts arose about the reliability of gas supply from Russia. Gazprom had temporarily halted deliveries to Ukraine. Nord Stream did not exist yet, and Ukraine was an important transit country for the EU.
Europas Abhängigkeit wurde erstmals offensichtlich – und Aserbaidschans Präsident Ilham Alijew bot flugs sein Land als Alternative an. „Bis letztes Jahr betrachteten wir die Türkei und Georgien als die einzigen Märkte für aserbaidschanisches Gas“, sagte Alijew damals. „Die Situation hat sich jetzt geändert.“
„Strategischer Partner“
The EU did not hesitate and actively promoted the construction of a pipeline in the following years. In 2011, the then President of the European Commission, Barroso, and Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger traveled to Baku to sign an agreement with Aliyev, in which the President guaranteed gas deliveries. The government in Baku suddenly found itself in a comfortable position, being able to choose the most lucrative deal from various options – and therefore played its hand accordingly.
At first, the Europeans had high hopes for the Nabucco pipeline, in which the German company RWE was involved. However, this project failed in 2013 when another connection was chosen for Azerbaijani gas deliveries: the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which stretches from Turkey and Georgia to the Greek border, and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which goes through Greece and the Adriatic Sea to Italy.
In 2014, the gas from Azerbaijan gained new significance. Not only was the security of gas transit through Ukraine debated again due to the occupation of Crimea, but Russia also decided to cancel the planned South-Stream pipeline, which aimed to bring gas directly to Europe through the Black Sea, bypassing Turkey and Ukraine. This made Azerbaijan the only option for Caspian gas. Criticism of the human rights situation in the authoritarian-ruled country also existed at that time. However, the European Commission continued to adhere to the plans and referred to Azerbaijan as a „strategic partner“.
While the regime in Baku was persecuting political dissidents, it launched a questionable PR campaign in Brussels. In 2017, an international network of journalists uncovered extensive money laundering and corruption. Among other things, politicians, journalists, and businessmen in Europe were allegedly influenced with Azerbaijani money. Investigations for bribery were initiated against two CDU deputies who were said to have received money from Baku. Both have denied the allegations.
Auch Erdoğan und Putin hofieren Alijew
Das erste Gas floss im Jahr 2020 durch den südlichen Gaskorridor. Seitdem hat Aserbaidschan seine Lieferungen deutlich erhöht. Und mit dem Ende der russischen Nord-Stream-Lieferungen fand sich Aserbaidschan plötzlich in einer deutlich stärkeren Verhandlungsposition. EU-Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen reiste nach Baku, um dem Diktator ihre Aufwartung zu machen – und die EU vereinbarte eine Verdopplung der Liefermengen. Noch immer liefert Aserbaidschan nur einen Bruchteil des europäischen Gases. Aber seit dem vergangenen Jahr kommt es auf jeden Kubikmeter an.
Aserbaidschan hat damit für die EU an Bedeutung gewonnen, aber auch andere Staatschefs hofieren Alijew. Während Baku für die Türkei schon aus alter Verbundenheit unter den Turkvölkern ein Verbündeter ist, spielen auch hier wirtschaftliche Gründe eine Rolle. Präsident Erdoğan positioniert sein Land als wichtigen Transitstaat zwischen dem Kaukasus und Europa. Wenige Tage nach dem Ausbruch der Gewalt in Nagornyj Karabach reiste er nach Baku, um ein Abkommen über eine weitere Gasleitung zwischen den beiden Ländern zu unterzeichnen.
Finally, Vladimir Putin can also get along well with the Aliyev regime – after Russia has long been critical of the competition from the southern pipelines. Azerbaijan now buys Russian gas and thus offers a new market. Baku denies that this Russian gas is then resold to the West, bypassing the sanctions.
Nadelöhr zwischen den Schurkenstaaten
Putin is interested in maintaining a good relationship with the neighboring country for another reason: Russia, which is isolated, is running out of open trade routes. A railway connection to Iran through Azerbaijan is expected to be established soon, as Iran is one of Russia’s few allies. This would provide Russian deliveries with access to the Indian Ocean and markets beyond. At the same time, Azerbaijan presents itself as a key state on the middle corridor from Europe to Asia, serving as a bottleneck through which more goods should flow to Europe. Railway transit through Azerbaijan has increased by 63 percent in 2022.
Ein Knotenpunkt zwischen Nord und Süd, Ost und West: Aserbaidschan steht damit mittendrin in den aktuellen Großkonflikten, geographisch wie ökonomisch. Und dem Land ist es gelungen, dass alle Seiten sich mit ihm arrangieren müssen, von Brüssel bis Moskau. Die Konsequenzen bekommen in diesen Tagen die Armenier zu spüren.